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The EU parliament has accepted a proposal of the EU commission on the backloading of EU emission
allowances (EUA), where the auctioning of EUAs is postponed to future time periods. The EU commission
has also proposed a market stability reserve (MSR), which is a quantity-based stabilisation policy that is
aimed at controlling the volume of EUAs in circulation.
Using an agent-based electricity market simulation with endogenous investment and a CO2 market
(including banking), we analyse the backloading reform and the proposed MSR. We ﬁnd backloading to
only have a short-term impact of CO2 prices; regardless, there is a signiﬁcant risk of high CO2 prices and
volatility in the EU ETS.
Our simulations indicate that the triggers of the proposed MSR appear to be set too low for the
hedging need of power producers, effectively leading to a stricter cap in its initial 10e15 years of
operation. While the current proposal may be improved by choosing different triggers, a reserve that is
based on volume triggers is likely to increase price volatility, contrary to its purpose. Additional problems
are the two-year delay in the response time and the abruptness of the response function, combined with
the difﬁculty of estimating future hedging behaviour.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
In recent years, the Europe Union's emission trading system (EU
ETS) has experienced very low prices and a high level of price
volatility. This has triggered a political discussion about stabilising
the EU ETS and improving incentives for investing in CO2 abate-
ment. As a result of this discussion, the EU parliament accepted a
proposal of the European Commission for “backloading” EU emis-
sion allowances (EUA), which means that a certain volume of EUAs
is not auctioned until later (European Commission, 2012a).
A second stabilisation measure, proposed in Europe's climate
strategy for 2020 to 2030, concerns a “market stability reserve”
(MSR) (European Commission, 2012b). The MSR is a quantity-based
policy instrument, based on the volume of EUAs in circulation. Both
policy measures together mark a signiﬁcant change of the EU ETS
policy framework.
This paper investigates whether these two policies are able to
stabilise prices (at a higher but still politically acceptable level) andein).
r Ltd. This is an open access articleto lower EUA price volatility. The long-term development of the
power sector is characterised by strong path dependencies and
non-linear relations. In addition, the actors are characterised by
bounded rationality, especially with respect to investment de-
cisions. The MSR itself also has a non-linear response function and
works with a time delay. Therefore, we use the agent-based model
EMLab-Generation (Richstein et al., 2014) to investigate the dy-
namic effects on investment of these policy changes. We extend
this model to include backloading and the MSR.
In the next section, banking and hedging in the EU ETS are
discussed because they play a key role in EUA price development.
Next, the two policies are described and analysed (see Section 2).
The model is introduced in Section 3, the results are presented in
Section 4 and the conclusions are presented in Section 5.2. Banking and the EU ETS reforms
In order to discuss the MSR and backloading, a short discourse
intowhat motivates actors in the EU ETS to hold European Emission
Allowances (EUAs) is necessary, since the MSR directly acts on the
quantity of EUAs held. Afterwards we introduce the proposals of
the European commission to stabilise EUA prices, and ﬁnallyunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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proposal.
2.1. The banking behaviour of power generators
We deﬁne banking as the holding of EUAs that exceed the
amount needed for compliance in the current year. Two principal
motivations are associated with banking EUAs: speculation based
on future expectations of EUA prices and hedging future sales of
products (most oftenpower) that have greenhouse gas emissions as
a side product or input cost (Schopp and Neuhoff, 2013).
Speculative banking in cap-and-trade schemes has a long his-
tory of treatment in academic literature, and is often simply
referred to only as banking. On the one hand, this is because
hedging was often ignored, thus making a distinction unnecessary,
but also because it was often treated as a decision under abatement
cost certainty, meaning that it was seen not as speculation but as a
means of optimal planning. In general, a permit trading schemewill
be efﬁcient in achieving a cumulative emission target only if un-
limited banking and borrowing is allowed and the social discount
rate is used to make banking decisions (Rubin, 1996). This is also
called inter-temporal efﬁciency because abatement takes place at
those points in time that lead to a cost efﬁcient achievement of the
overall abatement target. For example, it may be efﬁcient to post-
pone abatement, if considerable technological advancements that
will lower future abatement costs are expected.1 Leiby and Rubin
(2001) discuss unlimited banking and borrowing2 in permit
trading for stock and ﬂow pollutants under certainty (greenhouse
gases are a stock pollutant due to their long-term effect). They ﬁnd
that if investors have a higher discount rate than a social planner,3
companies will borrowmore and bank less than is socially optimal.
In other words, companies will postpone abatement further into
the future than is socially optimal. To counter this effect, they
suggest multiplying the volume of banked allowances with an in-
terest rate to incentivise banking and promote socially optimal
behaviour. Since Leiby and Rubin (2001) treat the problem as
continuous and certain, they are possibly still under-estimating the
effect of postponed abatement. Long-run infrastructures, that
determine a large part of emissions, are discrete objects that have
long-run effects and create path dependencies (see Section 3.1 for
more details). Furthermore, heterogeneous actors make decisions
under uncertainty. This could lead to further inefﬁciencies not
captured by Leiby and Rubin (2001).
Newell et al. (2005) discuss the effect abatement cost shocks
have on prices, meaning unanticipated changes in the costs of
abatement to reach a given target, for example due to lower de-
mand in a recession. Under unlimited banking and borrowing non-
persistent shocks lead to quantity shocks, not price shocks, due to
perfect inter-temporal arbitrage. For example in case of a negative
shock, due to a recession, ﬁrms will foresee that abatement will still
need to occur at the same costs level with a delay. Thus the CO2
price stays at a similar level, but ﬁrms start to bank credits (or
borrow less, depending on the original scenario). Thus, according to
economic theory the current banking surplus is actually too small
and not too big (at least under the assumption that the cap is set at
the politically optimal level), since higher (inter-temporally efﬁ-
cient) current carbon prices would lead to an even bigger surplus.1 Assuming that there is no negative effect on technological advancement due to
the postponement of installing abatement technologies.
2 To the knowledge of the authors no existing carbon trading scheme allows
borrowing. Possible reason are outlined by Fankhauser and Hepburn (2010), among
them adverse selection.
3 A social planner is a purely theoretical agent of welfare economics that opti-
mises welfare results for all involved parties.Newell et al. (2005) also discuss various options to stabilise prices
under persistent abatement cost shocks by adjusting quantities
based on ﬁxed rules or discretionary action by the regulator.
Currently, hedging in the EU ETS is mainly driven by future
power sales. This accounted for amajority of currently banked EUAs
at the end of 2013 (Neuhoff et al., 2012; Tschach et al., 2014). Power
companies sell their power on future markets to reduce volume
and price risks (Doege et al., 2009). When doing so, they also cover
the open positions for their production input, among them fuels
and EUAs. According to Eurelectric (2009), power producers in
Europe hedge between 10 and 20% of their output three years in
advance, 30e50% two years in advance and 60e80% one year in
advance on a cumulative basis. However, as acknowledged by the
European Commission (2014) hedging behaviour may change over
time: it depends on forward sales or contracts of companies, which
in turn might vary with the risks and volatility faced in the markets
in which the companies participate, the demand for forward sales,
and whether they can pass on their EUA costs to their customers
(which is why companies at risk of carbon leakagemay be provided
with free EUAs).
Neuhoff et al. (2012), based on a series of interviews with
stakeholders, stipulate that there is a difference between the in-
terest rates of speculative banking and hedging. The distinction
between hedgers and speculators is an accepted insight in ﬁnancial
theory (Bailey, 2005). Furthermore, Schopp and Neuhoff (2013)
point out that power producers might incorporate expectations
about prices into their hedging strategies. They may, for example,
increase the forward sales of carbon intensive production (e.g.,
coal) when they expect a tighter emission market (Schopp and
Neuhoff, 2013). This could also be described as an attempt to lock
in clean dark spreads,4 that appear favourable to power producers.
By changing their forward sales, they can hold more EUAs, while
still having no open position (that is, they do not hold emission
allowances for which they have not already sold the corresponding
electricity. Deviating from this rule would be speculative banking
and outside of the risk management criteria of many electricity
companies). Thus, according to Schopp and Neuhoff (2013), up to
the hedging horizon of 3e4 years and within the risk management
criteria of power companies, banking takes place at a low discount
rate (estimated to be between 0 and 10%). Banking volumes
exceeding this hedging ﬂexibility are discounted more heavily
(rates exceeding 10e15%). This possibly explains the low prices in
the EU ETS, since hedging ﬂexibility, as determined by the risk
management procedures of power producers, may well be
exhausted.
2.2. Improving the ETS: backloading and the MSR
The so-called “backloading” is a rescheduling of part of the
auctioning volumes of EUAs. As deﬁned by the European
Commission (2012a) and European Commission (2014b), for the
years 2014, 2015, and 2016, 400, 300 and 200 million fewer EUAs
respectively were intended to be auctioned than originally sched-
uled. These EUAs are auctioned at a later point in time, hence the
term “backloading”: In 2019, an additional 300 million EUAs will be
auctioned and in 2020 the auctioning schedule will be increased by
600 million EUAs.
The MSR is a quantity-based addition to the EU ETS active from
the year 2021 on (European Commission, 2014a): The amount of
EUAs that are auctioned is reduced if the upper threshold of 833
million EUAs in circulation is exceeded. In this case, with a two-year4 The gross margin of coal power plants after obtaining fuels and emission
allowances.
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are placed into the reserve. If the EUAs in circulation fall short of the
lower threshold of 400 million, 100 million EUAs are released with
a two-year delay. Thus a soft target corridor for banking EUAs is
introduced to the EU ETS. Additionally, 100 million EUAs are
released from the reserve if the price of EUAs exceeds the average of
the past two years by a factor of three.
These rules also can be described in terms of a response func-
tion, that is, the amount of EUAs injected or withdrawn from the
primary EUA auctions based on the amount of banked EUAs. Central
to this scheme is the speed (two years) and the shape of the
response function. The current proposal is non-continuous and
asymmetric, as seen in Fig. 1.
2.3. Uncertain effects of the proposed MSR
The concept of an allowance reserve for carbon trading
schemes is not new to academic analysis. It was introduced by
Murray et al. (2009), and compared to other instruments by
Fankhauser and Hepburn (2010), Grüll and Taschini (2011) and
Philibert (2009). So far, however, the term “allowance reserve”
has, to the knowledge of the authors, been associated with an
allowance reserve linked to price based rules. It can act as a simple
price ceiling with a quantity limit (Murray et al., 2009), or via more
elaborate rules, proposed by Taschini (2013) that avoid setting
explicit price caps, by working with a price trend trigger, and a
second quantity trigger that determines the size of the response.
The European Commission (2014) assessed several policy inter-
vention options and recommended the MSR based on pure
quantity triggers. They acknowledged that there is considerable
uncertainty regarding hedging behaviour of market participants,
and did not perform an assessment of possible price effects, since
“[m]odelling tools typically used by the Commission to assess the
impact of certain targets, be it GHG target or speciﬁc energy tar-
gets, are better able to assess mid to longer term scarcities and
price formation on the market, and are less well equipped to look
at interaction of the drivers and uncertainties within short periods
of time.”
Several industry analysts, as well as academics have commented
on the proposal. Acworth (2014) reviewed these initial (non-peer
reviewed) comments, coming to the conclusion that most analysts
welcome a change of the EU ETS, but are divided about whether the
proposal of the European commission is the right way to achieve
more supply side ﬂexibility of emission allowances. Critics pointFig. 1. Response curve of proposed MSR (not scaled to electricity sector of Central
Western Europe and Great Britain).
Adapted from Tschach et al. (2014).out that the MSR relies heavily on assumptions regarding the
hedging behaviour of market participants and that the surplus
might not be eroded quickly enough (Acworth, 2014). A simple rule
based mechanism may not be able to accommodate for unfore-
seeable large disturbances (Trotignon et al., 2014; Grosjean
et al.,2014). Finally, due to the two-year delay, the scheme suffers
from a timeliness problem and might increase mid-term price
volatility (Trotignon et al., 2014). In this paper, we focus on vola-
tility effects, since the results of Trotignon et al. (2014) are only
preliminary and not in-depth. Acworth (2014) concludes that
detailed and balanced assessments of the MSR are lacking. In the
following we discuss the MSR theoretically.
2.4. The effect of the MSR on price volatility
The economic rationale behind a MSR is inter-temporal efﬁ-
ciency (Tschach et al., 2014). As discussed in Section 2.1, prices do
not correspond to the long-term efﬁcient price signal needed for
decarbonisation, since market participants have a higher discount
rate than a social planner and will in general bank less than is so-
cially optimal. This problem becomes more pronounced with
macro-economic disturbances to an emission-trading scheme,
since they momentarily reduce scarcity of EUAs.
The ideal stability reserve (whether price or quantity triggered)
would thus immediately withdraw and inject the difference be-
tween the banking induced by a socially optimal price and the
actual surplus held by private market participants. Based on the
idea that banking still occurs (albeit too little due to a higher dis-
count rate), a quantity based MSR should thus amplify long-term
banking movements. Two aspects complicate that task in prac-
tice. First, EUAs are not only held in response to long-term future
expectations but also for medium-term hedging. The baseline from
which banked EUAs should be measured is thus the amount
necessary for hedging. This amount is not easy to unambiguously
determine (see Section 2.1), as medium-term expectations driven
through adjustment of hedged power sales might lead to opposite
movements in banked EUAs from long-term speculative banking.
Second, since the intention of market participants when buying
EUAs are not directly observable, the number of EUAs in circulation
is the earliest available at the end of each year (when the veriﬁed
emissions used to calculate the EUAs in circulation are reported). As
a result, there necessarily is a delay of greater than one year in the
response function of any quantity based MSR, which can possibly
have counter-intuitive effects.
Table 1 shows for four different situations how the relative
scarcity or excess of EUAs over time triggers the response of a MSR
(assuming that the changes in banking are large enough to elicit a
response). In the long-term structural excess situation, prices are
low, since speculative investors are needed to stabilise the CO2
price, who have higher discount rates that are signiﬁcantly above
discount rates of a social planner (Schopp and Neuhoff, 2013). This
is current situation of the EU ETS. TheMSRwouldwithdraw EUAs in
two years time. Since market participants can anticipate the
withdrawal, the EUA price would be supported immediately. In a
structural shortage, on the other hand, the banking stock is prob-
ably reduced, since non-compliance is heavily ﬁned and EUAs
would need to be handed in later. In this case, the MSRwould inject
EUAs to themarket, thus reducing the scarcity. Presumably theMSR
has been designed for these two situations.
However, not every change in the stock of banked EUAs neces-
sarily is due to a structural excess or shortage. If market partici-
pants' expectations of the EUA price deviate from current future
prices they will change their stock of banked EUAs. This change in
stock can be based on pure speculation in EUAs, but also on a
changed hedging strategy of producers, which has a time horizon of
Table 1
Banking & hedging scenarios.
Time horizon Situation Banking Price w/o MSR MSR
Long-term Structural excess [ Y Withdraws
Medium-term Expected relative excess a a Injects
Medium-term Expected relative shortage b b Withdraws
Long-term Structural shortage a [ Injects
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as the hedging purpose, discounting rates are lower and the
adjustment in EUAs in circulation is thus closer to the surplus
induced by an optimal price. Because of the two-year delay, the
response of a MSR can coincide with the expected event that led
market participants to hold a higher stock in the ﬁrst place. This
dynamic could thus exacerbate already existing scarcity. It is thus
important to include these dynamic effects in an analysis of the
MSR.3. Model description and assumptions
We ﬁrst explain our choice of methodology. The following
summarises the description provided in Richstein et al. (2014) and
de Vries et al. (2013), in which the model EMLab-Generation was
ﬁrst introduced. The reader is kindly referred to Richstein et al.
(2014) for a complete deﬁnition of the model. Except for explic-
itly mentioned differences, the model and scenario assumptions
used here are identical. The contribution of the paper at hand is the
addition of the MSR to the model. This model extension is pre-
sented in Section 3.5.5 For example regarding fuel, demand and technological development, as well as
political uncertainty.3.1. Choice of modelling methodology
The power sector and the EU ETS are characterised by several
features that are difﬁcult to model with traditional tools:
1. The price formation processes in power markets and decisions
of agents are non-continuous and can be highly non-linear.
2. Power plants are discrete objects with different underlying
technologies and long lifetimes.
3. Markets delegate decision-making in terms of infrastructure
investment and operation to private, heterogeneous agents
(compared to an optimising central entity).
The long life-times of power plants cause the system to be path
dependent; investments made now inﬂuence costs, emissions and
investments in power plants for decades to come. As a conse-
quence, the power sector cannot be assumed to be in a long-run
equilibrium, let alone in a long-run optimum, since the external
factors (fuel prices, demand levels, technological development)
affecting the equilibrium are constantly changing (Olsina et al.,
2006). The decarbonisation of the power sector is a process that
will take at least several decades. As the emission rate now is much
higher than it should be in the long run, the cumulative emissions
over this period will have a large impact on the total long-run cu-
mulative emissions.When evaluating the effect of climate policy on
the power sector, the emissions over the next several decades
should therefore be considered, rather than a possible end state
which is still several decades away at least. Because the path de-
pendency that is caused by investment decisions can be expected to
have a signiﬁcant impact on the emissions during the next decades
and should be considered when analysing the long-run effects of
climate policy.
Investment decisions are, at best, characterised by boundedrationality (as deﬁned by Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002). Due to the
complexity of the decision environment, deep uncertainties5 and
the limited processing capabilities of even large ﬁrms, investors
rely on satisﬁcing criteria, such as hurdle rates or scenario analysis
(Groot et al., 2013). Investors make reasonable decisions with the
resources they have. Examples are easy to ﬁnd: Spain, the
Netherlands and Germany have signiﬁcant over capacities of
combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) power plants, partly due to
errors in the forecasts of demand and EUA prices and under-
estimated impact of renewable energy policy.
While other methodologies exist to investigate the power
sector, agent-based models (ABMs) are especially well suited for
analysing this type of problem. In an agent-based model, according
to Bonabeau (2002), “a system is modelled as a collection of
autonomous decision-making entities called agents. Each agent
individually assesses its situation and makes decisions on the basis
of a set of rules”. Computers are then used to execute the algo-
rithmic description of the agents, which results in the emergent
macro-behaviour of the system under investigation. Epstein (1999)
argues for using an ABM when investigating a problem in which
“[…] individual behaviour is nonlinear and can be characterised by
thresholds, if-then rules, or nonlinear coupling”. This corresponds
to point 1 at the beginning of this section. ABM also is well suited to
simulate out-of-equilibrium economics, the process of equilibrium
formation, and the inclusion of historical path dependencies
(Arthur, 2006); this corresponds to the challenge raised under point
2. Finally, according to Epstein (1999), ABMs exhibit characteristics
that make them ﬁt for problems characterised by bounded ratio-
nality and agent heterogeneity (point 3).
Several authors have applied ABMs to the long-run develop-
ment of the electricity sector in recent years: To investigate issues
such as market concentration (Botterud et al., 2007), CO2 cap and
trade systems and CO2 taxes (Chappin, 2011; Chappin and Dijkema,
2009), renewable policy (Fagiani et al., 2013), the interaction of
renewable policy with climate policy (Fagiani et al., 2014), as well as
generation adequacy (Ringler et al., 2014). These observations also
led to broader research project from the authors of this article
investigating the long-term impacts of climate policies in the po-
wer sector, the creation of EMLab-Generation, and resulted in a ﬁrst
investigation of price caps in connected electricity markets
(Richstein et al., 2014).
The policies of backloading and the MSR have additional char-
acteristics that can be represented by agent-based modelling. The
backloading policy is related to the challenge of path dependency:
the research (and modelling) question is whether this variation
over time inﬂuences the decarbonisation path. The time delay by
which the proposed MSR responds to high or low volumes of
banked carbon credits requires a dynamic analysis; ABM provides a
natural way of doing so.
Fig. 2. Model ﬂow diagram.
Table 2
Agents that are active in the investigated scenarios and their levels of
complexity.
Agent names Complexity
Energy Producer High
TargetInvestor Simple Rules
PowerPlantManufacturer Accounting
PowerPlantMaintainer Accounting
BigBank Accounting
CommoditySupplier Accounting
EnergyConsumer Accounting
Government Simple Rules
ElectricitySpotMarket High
CommodityMarkets Simple Rules
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EMLab-Generation is an open-source6 agent-based model of
two interconnected electricity markets with a common emission
trading systemmodelled after the EU ETS, including the banking of
EUAs by energy producers. The two electricity markets modelled in
this paper are Central Western Europe (CWE, consisting of Belgium,
France, Germany, Luxembourg and The Netherlands) and Great
Britain (GB). Flows through an interconnector are determined by
market splitting. The time step of the model is one year.
Several types of agents are modelled; their behaviour is
described in terms of different roles (Chmieliauskas et al., 2012).
The sequence of the main roles is depicted in Fig. 2. In Table 2, an
overview of the agents in the model is provided, as well as a clas-
siﬁcation of the complexity of their roles. As the main agents in the
model, the energy producers have a high level of complexity. They
bid into the electricity markets, determine the fuel mix of their
power plants and buy fuel, make investment decisions, pay for the
various expenses, and maintain a bank balance. Fuel availability is
unlimited; fuel prices are scenario variables. As a proxy for national,
subsidy-driven investment in renewable energy, a subclass of en-
ergy producers with simpler investment behaviour was created;
these ‘target investors’ invest only in renewable energy and the
volume of their investment is exogenously determined.
In the CO2 market, the volume of EUAs that is auctioned annu-
ally is also set exogenously according to the long-run abatement
trajectory of the EU (see Appendix A for calculation of the emission
cap, and incorporation of the backloading policy). The government
adjusts this cap via the MSR mechanism, which is described in
Section 3.5. The ElectricitySpotMarket clears the two electricity
markets and the CO2 market. The remaining agents in the model do
not make active decisions, but simply serve as accounting entities
who track the various types of expenses of the energy producers.
The development of the generation mix is an emergent result of
the agents' investment decisions. These decisions are not neces-
sarily optimal. Energy producers make long-term forecasts of fuels6 The source codeused in thispapercanbe found in theonline supplementaryﬁle orat
https://github.com/EMLab/emlab-generation/tree/paper/euEtsMarketStabilityReserve,
additional information at http://emlab.tudelft.nl/.and CO2 prices using regression analyses that serve as inputs to
merit order forecasts for the two power markets. The agents have
limited knowledge of the future, since in reality energy producers
also face the challenge of forecasting and may make decisions that
turn out to be sub-optimal ex-post (see also Section 3.1).
3.3. Power plant operation and spot-market bidding
Power plants are dispatched according to merit order. Single-
fuel plants simply buy the fuel that they need. Energy companies
that own multi-fuel power plants decide on their fuel mix by using
a linear optimisation algorithm based on the previous year's CO2
prices. As part of the combined clearing of the electricity and CO2
markets, the fuel mix is updated so the fuel mix decisions are in
equilibrium with the electricity market results.
The variable fuel cost vcg,t of power plant g in time step t is
determined as the product of the volumes of the fuels (f) in fuel mix
sg,f,t and the fuel prices pf,t  1, divided by the fuel efﬁciency hg of the
power plant g:
vcg;t ¼
X
f
pf ;t1$sg;f ;t
hg
(1)
We assume that the energy producers add a 10%mark-up on the
variable fuel costs to arrive at their spot-market bids. This approach
is similar to Eager et al. (2012); modelling market power in more
detail exceeds the scope of this paper.
3.4. Interlinked electricity and CO2 markets
The electricity and CO2 market clearing algorithm leads to
optimal dispatch of the power plants, under the interconnection
capacity constraint and an inter-temporal emission constraint
(which takes expected emissions for a future year into account).
Because the model has a yearly time step, price variations are
modelled by using a step-wise load-duration curve for each of the
two electricity market zones. Each segment of the load-duration
curve represents a number of hours with similar load levels. We
use 20 segments (or load levels) in the model. Demand in each
segment is assumed to be inelastic. This abstraction allows for
shorter model run times, which make large Monte-Carlo simula-
tions computationally feasible.
The two spot markets and the interconnector capacity allocation
are cleared simultaneously through market splitting. In a ﬁrst step,
the bids of the power producers in the two markets are treated as
belonging to a single market. The bids are sorted by price and the
cheapest bids that are sufﬁcient to meet demand are accepted. If
the resulting interconnector ﬂow is less than the interconnector
capacity, the market is considered to be cleared. Otherwise, the
interconnector is assumed to be congested. In this case, its capacity
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the load of the importing country. The two zones are then cleared
separately with the adjusted loads. The prices are determined by
the marginal bids.
We describe here the basic CO2 market, while the algorithms for
the MSR are detailed in the following section. The algorithms for
the CO2 and electricity markets are closely connected. The CO2
market adds an emission constraint to the current electricity
market and a future expected electricity market. The Elec-
tricitySpotMarketAgent nests the clearing of the electricity spot
markets in an iterative algorithmwhich conducts a CO2 price search
under an emission constraint (Appendix A describes how the EU
ETS cap is scaled). The degree to which the agents increase or
decrease their volume of banked credits is determined centrally;
the results of banking movements are prorated to the agents based
on their emissions. In order to reﬂect the hedging and banking
behaviour of electricity producers, the emission constraint should
ensure that: a) the agents jointly try to hold enough EUAs for their
hedging requirements, while b) that there is some ﬂexibility for
inter-temporal arbitrage.
In order to simulate inter-temporal arbitrage (as a result of
which abatement occurs more efﬁciently over time), not only
should the current time step be considered, but also the future. To
limit computation time, we only take one reference year into ac-
count. Arbitrage takes place between the current year and three
years later, which is a typical time horizon for the banking behav-
iour of electricity producers. The clearing emission constraint
therefore includes the current year's emission cap CCO2 ;t and the
emission cap in three year's time CCO2;tþ3.
The default volume of hedged EUAs is equivalent to 80% of ex-
pected emissions in the coming year, 50% of expected emissions in
two years time and 20% in three years time. This is based on
empirical data of the hedging needs of European power producers
(Eurelectric, 2009; Neuhoff et al., 2012). This is represented in the
model by a banking target TB,t fromwhich the deviation DTB,t to the
current volume of banked emissions Bt is calculated
(DTB,t ¼ Bt  TB,t). When the volume of banked EUAs that is held by
the electricity producers is different from its target, the emission
constraint is adjusted by DTB,t/r. The revision speed factor r de-
termines how quickly the algorithm returns the banked volume of
EUAs to the banking target. It is set to 3 in this simulation.
The current cap, the future emission cap, and the banking target
are represented in a single clearing emission constraint, which then
is compared to the emissions of the current year (Et) and the ex-
pected emissions in three years time (bEtþ3). The emissions are
calculated by running the electricity market algorithm (described
above) for the current year and for the future year (taking expected
fuel prices, dismantlements and new builds into account), using the
same CO2 price pt,CO2. (The CO2 price is appreciated with a discount
rate of 5% for the future year, pt,CO2*(1 þ iB)3.) The CO2 price that
meets the constraint is found by the means of an iteration algo-
rithm that is described by Equation (2), inwhich the sum of the CO2
emissions in the current and the future years (the right-hand side of
the equation) must equal the CO2 caps in these years plus the dif-
ference in the volume of banked credits:
CCO2;t þ CCO2;tþ3 þ DTB;t

r ¼ Et pt;CO2
 þ bEtþ3 pt;CO2 1þ iBð Þ3
 
(2)
This procedure leads to banking behaviour as was described in
Section 2.1: the agents try to achieve their hedging target over time.
However, within a three-year period, the volume of banked EUAs
can vary from the hedging target. This is due to the ability of the
power producers to reduce emissions now rather than later, or viceversa, based on different abatement costs. If the emission cap
cannot be met, a maximum market clearing price of 120 Euros/ton
is assumed. At this price, power producers ﬁrst consume their
banked EUAs; if the cap is insufﬁcient, additional EUAs are supplied
according to the algorithm. The reason for limiting the CO2 price in
the model is that while more abatement at higher cost could occur
in the model, in the long term there are abatement options with
lower long-run marginal abatement costs. In addition, in practice
other sectors are included in the CO2 market, which provide more
short-term abatement options, as a result of which prices should
not be expected to rise to extreme heights. The 120 Euros/ton also
represents an abatement cost level above which further CO2 price
increases have a diminishing short-term abatement effect in the
model (see also Den Bergh and Delarue, 2015).
3.5. The market stability reserve (MSR)
TheMSR is closelymodelled after the actual, proposed design, as
described in Section 2.2. Before the electricity and CO2 markets are
cleared, the MSR adjusts the EU ETS cap for the current year t based
on the volume of EUA allowances that were banked two years ago.
If the volume of banked EUAs is within a certain target corridor, the
MSR does not change the cap; otherwise, the cap is adjusted. In our
model, we scaled the target corridor linearly to the scope of the
model (the electricity sectors of CWE and GB). If the banked al-
lowances in t  2 are above the upper trigger, 12% of these allow-
ances are deducted from the EU ETS cap in the current year. If the
banked allowances in t  2 are below the lower trigger, the MSR
releases a ﬁxed volume of EUAs (See also Fig. 1.)
The model's CO2 market algorithm should be adjusted in two
ways. First, it should take into account the emergency price trigger
that was described in Section 2.2. Second, the MSR should be
factored into the current emission cap and its effects should be
included in agent expectations for the future. This will inﬂuence the
market equilibrium and therefore also the current CO2 price.
If for more than six consecutive months the EUA price is above
the average price of the past two years, the MSR emergency price
trigger releases a ﬁxed volume of EUAs. Since our model does not
simulate events within one year, there are two possibilities for
implementing this rule. One is that a high price in the current year
triggers a release of credits in the following year. Alternatively,
when the EUA price is above the trigger, the EUA price ﬁnding al-
gorithm is rerunwith the release of EUAs for the current year. If the
released quantity is large enough to offset the shortage, this could
cause the EUA price to return to its normal level. We implemented
the second option because its effect is more direct; the potential
avoidance of high prices is justiﬁed by the downward pressure on
prices that would be caused by the expectation of an emergency
release.
To implement the MSR, the emission-clearing cap must be
adjusted. When active, the MSR changes the volume of auctioned
EUAs, so Equation (2) should reﬂect this change for the current year
as well as the expected change in the volume of auctioned EUAs in
the future. The original cap CCO2 ;t in the model is substituted by the
sum of the original cap and the action of the MSR in t (MSRt), which
depends on the volume of banked EUAs two years ago (Bt  2). The
expected action of the MSR in three years time (dMSRtþ3) depends
on the expected banked EUAs in the next year Bt þ 1 (due to the two-
year delay). Bt þ 1 is linearly interpolated between the banked
emissions of the current year Bt and the projected banked emis-
sions Bt þ 3 in three years time. Both Bt and Bt þ 3 are intermediate
results available during the iterative clearing of the CO2 and elec-
tricity markets. Thus the emission-clearing cap from Section 3.4 is
adjusted according to Equation (3) to take the action of the MSR
into account:
7 Our model probably overestimates the effect of nuclear dismantlement, since
CWE (via France) has an unusually high share of nuclear.
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 
þ DTB;t

r
¼ Et pt;CO2
 þ bEtþ3 pt;CO2 1þ iBð Þ3
 
(3)
3.6. Generation technologies, initial portfolio, fuel price and
demand trends
We modelled ﬁfteen power generation technologies, based on
the World Energy Outlook 2011 New Policies Scenario (IEA, 2011)
and additional assumptions (Richstein et al., 2014), including a
strong assumption regarding intermittent renewables. Since the
model does notworkwith hourly dispatch but with a load-duration
curve, the contribution of the renewables to the different load
segments is assumed to be ﬁxed by static contribution ratios. These
were determined based on empirical data from Germany (for more
details, see Richstein et al., 2014).
The initial generation portfolios in the model are based on
Eurelectric (2012) data, as well as on the average age structure of
different generation technologies in the EU (from RWE, 2008). As
we do not model market power, we assume the power plants to be
distributed equally among four energy producers per zone.
We model electricity demand as well as lignite, biomass, and
uranium prices as stochastic trends, using a triangular distribution
to calculate the yearly price growth. Natural gas and hard coal
prices are modelled as correlated stochastic Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
processes (see Richstein et al. (2014) for more details). They are
mean-reverting to the central fuel scenario of the UK Department
of Energy and Climate Change (Department of Energy and Climate
Change, 2012), which we extrapolated beyond 2035.
The step-wise load-duration function is calculated from hourly
ENTSO-E data from 2010 for CWE and GB. We assume demand
growth to be constant over all segments of the load-duration curve.
3.7. Investment in generation capacity
Investment in new power plants in the model is an iterative
process in which energy producers sequentially decide whether or
not to invest. One company's investment decision therefore in-
ﬂuences the subsequent decisions of other companies. Investments
take place until no company identiﬁes further investment oppor-
tunities. The order in which companies invest is random and
companies only invest their own zones (either CWE or GB). Equity
(at an interest rate of 12%) is assumed to account for 30% of in-
vestment capital, while the remaining 70% is assumed to be debt (at
an interest rate of 9%).
Generation companies base their investment decisions on a net
present value (NPV) calculation for different power generation
technologies, choosing the technology with the highest speciﬁc
NPV per megawatt (and only if the NPV is positive). NPVs are
calculated from bottom-up merit-order forecasts of the electricity
spotmarket in the generators' own zones. The expected operational
costs and revenues are calculated for a reference year (6e8 years
ahead, varying among agents to create heterogeneity), taking into
account expected age-based dismantlement as well as power
plants that are under construction (including the ones announced
in the current year). The agent estimates for fuel prices, CO2 prices,
and demand growth are based on a regression analysis of historical
prices in the model. The number of years used for regression
analysis varies between 4 and 6 for the different agents, leading to
slightly heterogeneous investment decisions. The annual capital
costs are the amortised loan costs. For a full description, please refer
to Richstein et al. (2014).The renewable target investors fulﬁl the renewable energy
policy targets, which are an exogenous input of the model (see
Richstein et al. (2014) for details), by bridging the gap between the
government targets for installed renewable capacities and private
investment in renewable technologies.
4. Results and discussion
This section is divided into three parts. In Section 4.1, we discuss
the speciﬁc EU ETS reforms, backloading, and the MSR, as proposed
by the EU commission. We do so by analysing CO2 prices, emissions
and banking behaviour. We also include a sensitivity analysis
regarding the hedging assumption of energy producers, and the
starting year of the stability reserve in this part. In the second part
(Section 4.2), we analyse the alternative design choices for theMSR.
In the third part (Section 4.3), we present a simpliﬁed model
illustrating the volatility effect the MSR might have on EUA prices.
Due to the stochastic input parameters and the long-term nature of
the model, we expect a wide range of results. Therefore, the ﬁgures
show uncertainty envelopes and, where necessary, a statistical
analysis of the results is carried out.
4.1. The proposed EU ETS reforms
4.1.1. Scenario description
We analyse three policy scenarios: the original EU ETS (“Pure-
ETS” scenario), the EU ETS with backloading (“BL” scenario), and a
scenario with both backloading and the introduction of the MSR in
year 2021 of the simulation (the “MSR” scenario). We perform a
Monte-Carlo simulation for each policy scenario to test perfor-
mance under different possible futures. As described in Subsection
3.6, we stochastically generated 120 different fuel price and de-
mand time series. In order to avoid random differences in inputs for
individual policy runs, we used the same 120 time series inputs for
each policy scenario. This also enabled make pairwise comparisons
of individual runs with identical inputs for fuel prices and demand
development in different scenarios. Since we only analyse the
contribution of the electricity sector to the EU ETS emissions, we
scale the emissions cap and the volume of the MSR down to the
electricity sectors of CWE and UK. Backloading is implemented by
changing the volume of auctioned EUAs (see Appendix A).
4.1.2. CO2 prices, emissions and banking
Fig. 3 shows the development of EUA prices and banked vol-
umes by the electricity companies in the model. In the PureETS
scenario, price spikes occur in most runs for the years 2021e2026.
Reasons are the low initial prices, which delay low-carbon invest-
ment, and the age-based dismantlement of nuclear power plants.7
The price spikes in the model occur because the sector needs to
make a switch from a situation with abundant EUAs to one of
increasing scarcity. Over time, the investments in CO2 reduction
cause the EUA price to stabilise.
While backloading has a signiﬁcant effect on CO2 prices in the
initial years of the simulation, it does not lessen the price volatility
and price shocks. Up to year 2016, backloading increases CO2 prices,
while there is a downward pressure on prices in years 2017e2020
as the EUAs are returned to the market. This corresponds to earlier
ﬁndings by Trotignon (2012, p.117ff), whose model sees an initial
price increase, followed by a price collapse. In our model, back-
loading only has a minimal impact on prices fromyear 2021 on. The
upward effect on prices in the early years is not sufﬁcient to induce
Fig. 3. EUA prices and banked EUAs. The upper and lower triggers are shown as dashed lines in the MSR scenario. For comparison, we added the scaled EU ETS cap.
Fig. 4. MSR volume.
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price peak around year 2026, which occurs both in the PureETS and
the backloading cases of the simulation. A perfect market would
completely price in the return of allowances to the market, leading
to no price effect at all. In our model, we assume the cost-of-carry
assumption to hold only for the three-year hedging time horizon of
power producers. As a result, backloading does cause price in-
creases and decreases.
If a MSR is introduced to the simulation in year 2021, the early
years are identical to the BL scenario. Only from year 2018 on, when
the future effect of theMSR is incorporated in the CO2 price, the two
EUA price paths diverge in the simulation results. While the MSR is
intended to have a stabilising effect, within the context of this
simulation, we observe that it increases EUA prices signiﬁcantly in
the years 2021e2031. It also increases the risk of shortage prices.
The reason can be seen in theMSR panels of Fig. 3, which shows the
simulated banking behaviour of power producers. The triggers of
the proposed MSR are set far below the hedging demand of energy
companies. As a result, the MSR is activated immediately, just when
EUAs are already becoming scarce. The expectation of higher EUA
prices in the future prompts companies to bank more credits than
in the BL scenario, which exacerbates the shortage. Even without
modelling speculative behaviour, the MSR appears to trigger a price
‘bubble’.
The very high EUA prices in the model would probably not
materialise in real life; our model does not factor in the ﬂexibility of
the demand for EUAs in other sectors, electricity price demand
elasticity, or any policy intervention that might occur if prices
become too high. However, the results indicate a signiﬁcant risk
that MSR effects are contrary to policy goals, promoting instability
rather than stability.
Until year 2040 of the simulation, the MSR constantly removes
EUAs from the auctions in nearly all cases (Fig. 4). The emergency
trigger created to release credits in case the EUA price triples within
a short period of time only has a limited effect in the context of our
simulation (and probably also in reality), for two reasons. First, high
medium-term prices make it unlikely that credits are released from
theMSR. To illustrate, amedium-term average price of 50/Vton setsthe price trigger to 150/Vton. Second, the regulation of the MSR is
deﬁned in such a way (European Commission, 2014b) that when
the volume of banked EUAs is above the adding (lower) threshold of
the MSR, the price trigger does not lead to a net release of credits
from the MSR. It merely slows down the net addition of EUAs to the
reserve, since the volume of EUAs in circulation is still above the
target corridor. For instance, if prices have risen from 20/Vton to
more than 60/Vton, but the volume of banked allowances is still
higher than the upper MSR trigger (for instance because power
companies expect the credit price to rise in the future), the emer-
gency price trigger returns fewer credits to the market than were
taken out due to the quantity trigger; the net effect remains a
reduction of credits.
In our simulation, the effect of the MSR on emissions is quite
clear. Since the MSR removes credits from the market and hardly
Fig. 5. Total CO2 emissions.
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lation period are signiﬁcantly below the emission cap by 5e10%
(Fig. 5).84.1.3. Sensitivity analysis: CO2 hedging assumptions
The hedging behaviour of power generators is a central model
input and thus warrants a sensitivity analysis. As a ﬁrst step, we
analyse an additional scenario in which we assume that only
electricity companies wish to hedge their risks by banking EUAs.9
Since we do not explicitly model the other sectors, we investigate
this by changing the relative levels of the trigger size. Whereas in
the previous MSR scenario, the triggers were scaled to the size of
the electricity sectors in CWE and the UK, as compared to the entire
ETS, we now scale the triggers to the size of CWE and the UK
electricity sectors as compared to the entire electricity sector in the
EU ETS (see Appendix A). We limit our analysis to the differences in
prices and hedging behaviour. Fig. 6 shows that even when it is
assumed that there is no banking in other sectors, the triggers of
the MSR still are set below the assumed hedging requirements of
electricity producers. However, in 2031 for most of the simulation
runs, the MSR ceases to remove EUAs from the auction. This
relaxation of the cap leads to a slight depression in prices between
2030 and 2040.
Next, we analyse the effects of different hedging strategies of
electricity producers on the MSR. In Table 3, the percentage of8 It should be taken into account that the simulation starts with the agents
having a certain volume of banked credits. Thus, the PureETS and BL case may have
small excess emissions over the simulation period without breaching the cap.
9 The demand for hedging in the other sectors in the EU ETS is debatable: even if
they receive free allowances they should hedge to the degree that they can pass
their opportunity costs on to their customers.expected emissions that is hedged for the coming three years is
detailed for the three sensitivity scenarios. The base scenario is the
one used so far. The LowerBanking scenario is the lower estimation
of hedging behaviour given by Eurelectric (2009). The TRBanking is
a hypothetical hedging behaviour that would lead to a hedging
target in 2021 in the range of the MSR triggers. We set the hedging
behaviour for the static case, using the original emission cap, and
scaling the hedging ratios down so that the emission capmultiplied
with the banking ratios falls within the trigger levels.
We ﬁrst analyse the effect of different hedging levels on prices in
the scenarios without a MSR (PureETS and Backloading). Two pe-
riods can be distinguished in the simulation: one with low initial
prices and a subsequent price peak (years 2011e2031), and another
for the relatively stable period afterwards (Fig. 7). In the ﬁrst period,
the hedging strategies impact prices signiﬁcantly. At lower hedging
levels, the initial prices are lower, since power producers in the
simulation need to bank less to reach their hedging target ratio
(Fig. 8). This hedging ratio is above the starting volume of banked
EUAs in the BaseBanking scenario, close to it in the LowerBanking
scenario, and below it in the TRBranking scenario. In the context of
the simulation, the price peak on the other hand is higher and has a
longer duration with smaller banking ratios. This highlights the
potential role that hedging might have played in keeping EUAs
prices above zero in the recent years, as companies built up their
hedging portfolio. In the period after year 2031, simulated price
levels and volatility are relatively similar in the different hedging
scenarios. This points out that barring external market distur-
bances, even a moderate hedging volume is sufﬁcient to stabilise
the ETS in the simulation.
In the presence of the MSR, there is no noticeable difference
between the BaseBanking and LowerBanking scenarios. Only in
the very low TRBanking scenario is the peak price period short-
ened, as the MSR takes out fewer EUAs due to the lower hedging
Fig. 6. Comparing the standard scenarios to a scenario where the electricity sector is the only sector with hedging requirements.
Table 3
Investigated banking/hedging ratios.
Banking assumption 1st year 2nd year 3rd year
BaseBanking 80% 50% 20%
LowerBanking 60% 30% 10%
TRBanking 26.7% 16.7% 6.7%
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corridor much earlier. We do not, however, analyse the direct ef-
fects of lower hedging ratios on the electricity market. In accor-
dance with the principle that there should be no open trading
positions, we would expect future sales of electricity to also be
lower.4.1.4. Sensitivity analysis: introduction time for the MSR
Due to the backloading measure, a large volume of EUAs is
returned to the market before the start of the third trading period
and the tentative starting date of the MSR in 2021. This might lead
to a collapse of EUA prices during this period. A possible counter-
measure is to introduce the MSR at an earlier point in time. To
investigate this sensitivity, we simulated the possible impact of
introducing the MSR in year 2018.
As can be seen in Fig. 9, the earlier introduction date prevents a
collapse of prices in the years 2016e2021. As a result of the more
continuous EUA price and the earlier investment in low-carbon
technologies, the mid-term peak is lower10 and shorter. However,
due to the shortage created by the MSR reserve in the years
2021e2031, the EUA price is in most cases still higher than in the
backloading case. The lower part of the ﬁgure shows clearly that the
early introduction shaves off part of the EUAs that are brought back
to the market during backloading. This leads to less variation in the
supplied EUAs and a more continuous banking path.10 An additional sensitivity analysis with a higher maximum EUA price showed
the peak to be lower than in the base-case scenario.4.2. Alternative designs of the MSR
In Section 4.1, we indicated that the parameters of the MSR are
not set at the correct levels if our assumptions about hedging vol-
umes are correct. In Section 2.4, we theorised that due to the time
delay of the MSR and the potentially contrary effects of short-term
hedging behaviour relative to long-term expectations, the intro-
duction of the MSR might increase the volatility of EUA prices. In
this section, we investigate the effects of alternative trigger levels
on price volatility.4.2.1. Scenario description
Since the MSR is intended as an integral part of the EU ETS for
the foreseeable future, we investigated target corridors that decline
in proportion to the cap, given that hedging volumes depend on
emission levels. Since this declines with the cap, the trigger and
response levels should decline proportionately.
The centres of the target corridors are determined by using
three consecutive years of the EU ETS cap and multiplying them
with the hedging ratios of the base-case scenario in Table 3. Around
these target corridors, we perform a sensitivity analysis regarding
the corridor width: ± 30%,± 20% and ± 10% of the target corridor's
centre value, termed Cor30, Cor20 and Cor10 in the analysis. Next,
we vary the response size of the MSR (i.e., how many EUAs are
removed or injected to the market). Res10 corresponds in size to
half the corridor width of Cor10 (based on a ﬁxed percentage of
total banked emission when directly at the upper trigger, and a
yearly ﬁxed amount when below the lower trigger). The same
procedure was used to determine the response size of Res20 (with
Cor20) and Res30 (with Res30). In the sensitivity analysis, we
compare all combinations between Cor10, Cor20 and Cor30 and
Res10, Res20 and Res30 (Fig. 10). The response curves for the ﬁrst
year of operation (year 2021) are depicted in Fig. 10. As the ETS cap
declines, the response curves are scaled by the same ratio (also
Fig. 12).
Fig. 7. EUA prices in different hedging scenarios.
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Figs. 11 and 12 show the development of simulated EUA prices
and banked EUAs over time. In general, the medium-term price
peak increases with the narrowness of the banking corridor (Cor10
has a higher peak than Cor30) and with the strength of the
response (Res30 has a higher peak than Res10). This is a direct
result of the delay of the MSR and the general scarcity of credits
around the year 2026: the more easily the MSR is triggered, and the
larger the amount of removed EUAs, the more frequent and sub-
stantial is the EUA shortage in the simulation.11 We use the standard deviation as a proxy for price volatility, since zero prices
occur. Thus the standard measure of volatility, standard deviation of logarithmic
returns, cannot not be applied.4.2.3. EUA price volatility
In order to check the hypothesis that a MSRmight increase mid-term volatility, we compare its effect on the standard deviation (SD)
of simulated EUA prices.11 To make the results more robust, we only
use EUA prices from year 2031 on (thus excluding the initial low
price years and the price peak, which have an obvious increasing
impact on SD) and perform a pairwise comparison between indi-
vidual runs in the Backloading and MSR scenarios. Here, pairwise
comparison means that the two individual runs that are compared
have exactly the same exogenous input parameters (such as fuel-
Fig. 8. Banked EUAs in different hedging scenarios.
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In general, the MSR was found to increase the standard devi-
ation of EUA prices in the simulation. As evident in Fig. 13, the size
of the increase varies signiﬁcantly (with some individual runs
showing a decrease in price SD). However, the increase of EUA
price SD is statistically signiﬁcant in all corridor scenarios, with a
majority of runs having a larger SD than the Backloading scenario.
Regarding the response size of the reserve and the corridor width,
the results are mixed. While the median EUA price SD strictly
increases with an increase in the response size of the reserve
(Fig. 13 and Table 4), corridor width suggests no clear impact
(Fig. 14).4.3. Volatility analysis with simpliﬁed model
Since in the large-scale model, the effects of several factors (such
as imperfect foresight and stochastic inputs) are superimposed, a
simpliﬁed version of the model can be used to illustrate the reason
behind the increased EUA price volatility. The simpliﬁedmodel has a
linear load-duration curve, a static portfolio without investment of
three types of power plants (coal, CCGT, andOCGT), and only a single
exogenous change, namely the reduction of the emission cap in year
5 (dash-dotted line in lower-left panel). As can be seen in the stan-
dard case without the MSR (left side of the graph), agents reduce
their emissions (dashed line in lower-left panel) three years ahead of
Fig. 9. Comparing the standard scenarios to a scenario with an earlier introduction of the MSR.
Fig. 10. Response curves of target corridors investigated in the sensitivity analysis for
the ﬁrst year of operation (year 2021). Later years are scaled down with the cap.
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After the reduction of the cap agents reduce their bankedEUAs to the
new hedging-rate targer. As a result of this inter-temporal arbitrage,
over time the EUA price gradually increases.12
In the right panel, the same situation is depicted with aMSR and
a 30% corridor around the standard hedging rate of the power
producers, which is reduced together with the cap. When triggered
on the upper side, the MSR removes 16% of allowances from the
market as occurring in years 5e8 (by reducing the emission cap in
the affected years: dotted-dashed line lower-right panel). As can be
seen, the MSR creates scarcity for a limited period of time, which
increases prices. There also is a self-enforcing dynamic; the
shortage induced by the MSR leads the agents to bank more EUAs,
since they see approaching scarcity. This in turn leads to a larger
MSR response (as explained theoretically in Section 2.4).12 The short decrease from year 2e3 is a model artefact.Our model does not capture speculative banking. It could be
argued that this would soften the price peak. However, we follow
the argumentation of Schopp and Neuhoff (2013) and Neuhoff et al.
(2012) in that hedging by power producers is limited to a time
horizon up to 3e4 years, beyond which speculative investors have
higher discount rates that limit their impact on market prices. One
could also argue that agents would extend their banking horizon if
their can clearly foresee this dynamic. This criticism has some
justiﬁcation, but to close their trading positions, they would also
need to increase forward electricity sales by ﬁnding new buyers.
Second, this dynamic would not be clearly visible given the noise of
other market movements.4.4. Reﬂection on the assumptions
Modelling is the art of capturing the essentials of a systemwith a
simpliﬁed description. Reﬂecting on our assumptions and results,
the model does not deliver precise market forecasts; we use it
instead to investigate price and investment dynamics in the power
sector, as well as implications for the EU ETS and potential reforms.
Themodel excludes a large part of the EU ETS; we only represent
the electricity sectors of Great Britain and Central-Western Europe.
Other economic sectors and countries are not modelled; nor do we
model the price elasticity of demand. An example consequence is
that the impact of the age-based dismantlement of nuclear power
plants from 2020 to 2030 in France is exaggerated. We expect a
larger market to dampen such effects.
Second, as previously mentioned, because the energy producers
in the model are not able to forecast fuel prices, electricity prices,
CO2 prices, and demand growth perfectly, they are limited in their
capability to make sound investment decisions. Power producers
also are constrainedwith regard to credit banking for the next three
years. As discussed in Section 2, we believe this to be a reasonable
assumption. Nonetheless, if long-term speculative investors satis-
ﬁed with lower interest rates were present in the market, they
would likely dampen volatility effects induced by the time delay of
the MSR.
Fig. 11. EUA prices in alternative target corridor scenarios.
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We applied the agent-based model EMLab-Generation, which
simulates investment in two interconnected electricity markets
(based on Central-Western Europe and Great Britain), to investigate
the possible effects of backloading and market stability13 reforms
on the dynamic properties of the EU Emission Trading Scheme. We
also analysed alternative parameter settings for the MSR.
Backloading increases CO2 prices in the short term but might
lead to a price collapse when the permits are returned to the13 As proposed by the European commission.market at the end of the trading period. In the medium and long
term, the effects of backloading are small. In the scenarios both
with and without backloading there is a risk of CO2 price shocks
and consequently high costs to electricity consumers. Backloading
mainly shifts prices and volatility to a later point in time. A key
assumption in the analysis concerns the banking behaviour of EU
ETS actors. We assumed that the dominant reason for power gen-
erators to bank CO2 credits is to hedge their future electricity sales.
The proposed MSR appears to be at risk of destabilising the EU
ETS. This could lead to an increase in CO2 prices and price volatility.
The primary culprit is the wrong parameterisation of the policy,
which is designed to maintain a volume of CO2 credits that is far
lower than what we assume is the hedging need of companies.
Fig. 12. Banked EUAs in alternative target corridor scenarios.
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of carbon emission allowances. If companies continue to hedge
their future sales with banked credits, the volume of banked credits
will always be so high that the reserve will not return credits to the
market. Alternatively, power companies might not be able to hedge
their future power sales.
Regardless of whether our estimation of hedging behaviour is
correct, our results demonstrate the vulnerability of the MSR to
inaccurate hedging assumptions. Given that it is difﬁcult to forecast
hedging behaviour, it is important to limit the sensitivity of the
reserve's response function to inaccurate estimations of hedging
demand. In the current design a large step change at speciﬁc trigger
volumes for might increase price volatility in the market.The commissions' proposal of the MSR contains the possibility
of an emergency intervention in case of high prices. However, the
rules for emergency intervention are designed in such a way that
high prices might still occur without triggering a response. On the
other hand, intervention could be triggered by a tripling of low
prices (e.g. from 2 to 6 EUR/ton). Moreover, the price trigger may
counteract the volume trigger in certain cases.
Finally, we ﬁnd that even if the parameters of the MSR are
adjusted to the hedging levels of power producers, the reserve
might still increase EUA price volatility because the two-year delay
might lead to a situation inwhich the stability reserve exacerbates a
foreseeable shortage or excess of credits (which could be triggered
by rational mid-term banking behaviour of agents).
Fig. 13. Boxplot of the increases in standard deviation between the alternative target corridor scenario run and corresponding backloading run.
Fig. 14. Simpliﬁed model of an expected mid-term shortage with and without MSR.
Table 4
Increase of EUA price standard deviation in runs compared to Backloading.
Scenario/Quantile 25% 50% 75%
Cor30-Res30 0.03 0.18 0.47
Cor30-Res20 0.05 0.10 0.36
Cor30-Res10 0.09 0.02 0.25
Cor20-Res30 0.02 0.14 0.50
Cor20-Res20 0.11 0.07 0.28
Cor20-Res10 0.07 0.03 0.23
Cor10-Res30 0.08 0.15 0.53
Cor10-Res20 0.02 0.11 0.39
Cor10-Res10 0.08 0.04 0.23
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should be adopted, as proposed by Tschach et al. (2014). However,
this would not resolve the fundamental problem of the two-year
delay. A constructive alternative would be the introduction of
moderate EUA price ﬂoors and ceilings. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, this would not jeopardise long-term abatement targets
(Richstein et al., 2014). Another alternative is more discretionary
adjustments of EUA supply, for example by a CO2 central bank (de
Perthuis and Trotignon, 2013). If these options are politically un-
feasible, price-trend triggers as proposed by Taschini et al. (2014)
might be better than the pure quantity triggers of the current
proposal, since they do not suffer from delays and are not easily
manipulated. Further investigation would be needed prior to
J.C. Richstein et al. / Utilities Policy 35 (2015) 1e18 17implementing these proposals.
In order to prevent a price collapse when the backloaded credits
are returned to the market at the end of the current trading period,
the reserve should be introduced earlier in time. Alternatively,
backloaded credits could be used as a starting stock of the reserve.
We recommend reconsideration of the MSR in the form origi-
nally proposed by the European Commission. Based on our model,
it appears that the MSR might cause EUA price instability in the
medium term. Our research shows that different trigger levels may
improve the performance of the MSR, but determining optimal
trigger levels will be difﬁcult. Therefore we recommend adjusting
the trigger levels when empirical data about banking and hedging
become available. Further empirical research into the hedging and
banking requirements of agents in the EU ETS is needed.
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Appendix A. Calculation of the emission cap and scaling of
the MSR
The emissions cap is calibrated using the 20% reduction target
for 2020 as compared to 2005 emissions (European Commission,
2010) and an 80% reduction target for 2050 as compared to 1990
emissions (European Commission, 2011). This also corresponds to
the more recent goal of a 40% reduction by 2030 and the synony-
mous adoption of a 2.2% reduction factor from 2020 on (European
Commission, 2012b).
We decided to use the data reported to the UNFCCC (European
Environment Agency, 2012b) to ﬁrst calculate the electricity spe-
ciﬁc emissions (using the emissions of the sector 1.A.1.A., “Public
Electricity and Heat Production”) in 2005 and 1990, to than deduct
a linearly reducing emission cap. The reason for choosing the
UNFCCC in contrast to the CITL data (European Environment
Agency, 2012a) was twofold: the category in UNFCC (“Public Elec-
tricity and Heat Production”) more closely matches the electricity
sector than the sector 1. (“Combustion Installations”) in CITL. Also,
the UNFCC data reach back to 1990, as compared to 2005 for the
CITL data.
For the scaling of theMSR, we used CITL data, since other sectors
in UNFCCC are not included in the EU ETS. We compared emissions
in CWE and GB in all sectors to the combustion installations in
these regions, which resulted in a scaling factor of 34.7%. While this
factor overestimates the emissions of the power sector, the over-
estimation clearly goes into the correct direction, since the power
sector holds a majority of EUAs and this is the number relevant to
scaling the MSR. In the sensitivity analysis discussed in Section
4.1.3, an alternative scaling factor of 72.41% is used, which is thepercentage of combustion installation emissions in CWE and GB
relative to all emissions of combustion installations in the EU ETS.
This is a proxy for the assumption that only the electricity sector
banks in the EU ETS.
Backloading is implemented by changing the volume of
auctioned EUAs. We smooth the real-world changes in auctioning
schedules out by spreading the backloading plans of single years
over three years. The reason for doing this stems from how we
model banking: since the CO2 market clearing algorithm relies on
the current year (t), and a future year (tþ3), the simulation is
sensitive to large changes in the auctioned volumes of EUAs in
single years. In reality, actors' reactions would be more reﬁned,
resulting in a response more similar to smoothed backloading.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2015.05.002.
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